Thursday, June 4, 2009

Horse Wrestling

The picture, of a characteristically over-sized statue in front of the Bishkek Palace of Sport (state gym complex), is not entirely accurate. There is a sport in Kyrgyzstan called Oodarysh, which involves two men westling eachother while on horseback, the victor being the first to dismount the other. In point of fact, most sports in Kyrgyzstan (aside from the ubiquitous football) seem to involve being on a horse. Some are straight-up horse races, though usually over long distances rather than circular tracks, while others are games of skill, involving obstacle courses and marksmanship. One is described as a mixture between Rugy and Polo, with the added twist that it is played not with tanned animal skin stuffed with cotton (like football), but instead with the decapitated carcas of a goat (they do pull out all the innards first). The lack of symbolic transferrance in this case is hard to ignore - Why not a rubber goat carcass, for example?

Anyway, the point is that no Kyrgyz athlete regularly hefts their steed upon their shoulders. But what an image! In a society where being on horseback is the default location for virtually every activity except sleeping and eating, the myth of a great warrior lifting his horse onto his back is a complex testament of strength and a radical reversal of social norms.

And that, oddly enough, brings me to the actual topic of this post: "Modern Central Asia transition to independence: the impact of alternative traditions," a lecture by Carter W. Page, a US investment banker-cum-academic, I attened at the American University of Central Asia. The office sent me to check it out, but to be honest it was more an effort to keep me busy than an actual journalistic assignment.

Mr. Page has spent most of his career working for Merryl Lynch and coordinating their assessments of investment opportunities in Russia and Central Asia. Again, follow the coded language. "Investment opportunities" equals "Energy Development." "Energy Development" equals "Oil and Gas exploration and export."

So this is a gentleman who has advised companies on which projects, governments, etc. they would have the best chance of procuring beneficial returns on their investments to the tune of around $15 billion. That's his personal involvement, it represents only a small fraction of the overall "energy" investment in the region.

Now Mr. Page has given up the financial sector (well, partially, he's still a consultant for corporations curious about getting started in CA), and decided to become an academic. While he pursues his Ph.D. at the London School of Oriental and African Studies (a very prestigious institution despite its archaically offensive name), he is conducting research and giving presentations to scholars and businessmen about what, in his opinion, differentiates development planning in Central Asia from other regions.

He talked for 30 minutes, answered questions for 30 minutes, and after an hour had bascially achieved nothing. Here's the gist of his argument:
Central Asia is "different" (from what he didn't specify. Isn't every place "different" in some way?). Further, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, each of the 5 Central Asian republics has diverged, forging unique policies and international relations. As a result, it is getting more difficult to make general statements about "Central Asia" (great point) - so here is my general statement about why Central Asia is "different" - they have "alternative traditions."

(I'm not making this up. The next part gets so ridiculous, that I'll hold my comments to the end.)

The first of these is the "Silk Road Tradition," which demonstrates the natural proclivity of Central Asians for international trade, their inherent entrepenurialism, innovation, flexibility, hard work, and individualism. Since the days of the Silk Road "a thousand years ago," the most significant change is the speed of international commerce - it's gotten faster.

The other tradition is that of the Soviet Union, which despite its demonization by "other Western scholars," has an important legacy in the "traditions" of commerce in modern Central Asia. (these weren't discussed in detail, though one assumes he is referring to the 5 Year Plans of the early Soviet period, the communal ownership of business, the forced collectivization of agriculture into Kolhozes, the entire transportation network - still in use, and the creation of the 5 recognized nationalities, an artificial project that including the synthesis of written languages, national borders, and as much repression of Islam and other religions as possible, etc.)

The heart of his analysis concerned the degree to which individual countries in Cenral Asia accepted a "Liberal Economic" versus a "Centralized Control" policy in regard to their domestic and international trade. A "Liberal-Domestic" position being that of total privatization, while "Central Domestic" is total nationalization. "Liberal International" would be Globalization, while "Central International" is "State Sovereignty," a confusing term he did not elaborate upon.

To backup his analysis, Mr. Page referenced the useful academic tools of Wallerstein's theory of World-Systems Analysis and Braudel's Longue-Duree, though I dare say each rolled over a bit in the grave (apologies to Wallerstein, still alive) at the injustice. WSA is based on considering multiple (perhaps even all) disciplines when making judgements about a cultural group, and is inherently anti-Globalization in its enforced respect for individual cultures and the disdain for manipulation thereof. Braudel's argument with historians, for which he founded the new theory, is that when considering matters of human civilization, it is pointless to look at events and short periods of time because only the larger arc of social progress eliminates inconsistencies. For Braudel, the question is the development of Capitalism since the 15th century; the question of Global Capitalism since 1920, much less globalization in Central Asia since 1991, is meaningless.

Sadly, the misapplication of these two well-known (within academic circles) theories is only one of the many weaknesses in Mr. Page's lecture. He referred regularly to his "research," but it is hard to imagine what, exactly, he's been researching to arrive at points which are so bland, and historical facts which are simply incorrect.

The origin of the Silk Road, for example, is very hard to nail down, mostly because the term is itself largely meaningless. Some silk trade existed with China even in ancient Egypt, but as conceived today as "a commercial network / trade route between China and Europe" it's hard to argue that the Silk Road ever existed. There were trade networks between China and Central Asia. Many of these connected to other routes between CA and Iran. From Iran, goods could proceed to Turkey, Iraq, or the Levant. From the Gulf, goods went to Egypt and East Africa. From the Levant and Turkey, goods could be shipped to Italy or Austria. No single individual was present for this entire route, and few participated in more than one leg. Each part could equally be said to be "the Silk Road." In other words, overland caravan trade across Central Asia was just as much the "Silk Road" as Italian shipping in the Mediterranean.
Yet I doubt Mr. Page would cite "The Silk Road" tradition as a foundational aspect of Italian, Iraqi, Austiran, Turkish, Iranian, or Egyptian modern business practices, much less that he could explain how the "Silke Road tradition" or Central Asia is so radically disimiliar from the "Silk Road Tradition" of everywhere else in the non-African/non-American world.

Add onto that further bad history - his use of the term "a thousand years ago," a figure he repeated often as it if was definitive, is ridiculous. Surely he isn't suggesting that the Silk Road was at its apex or origin in the year 1009! This term is used to denote "a long time ago," or more blunty, "since time eternal," effectively nullifying any possibility of, well... HISTORY.

It is hard to say when the "Silk Road" started, but we do have rough figures on the amount of goods transferred starting in the 12th century thanks to tarif records. What we know is that the amount of trade was in regular flux. Some periods of time saw more trade than others, and after the 16th century, trade dropped dramatically and has never since (until perhaps recent times) returned to its earlier levels, much less international importance. Some blame the "end of the Silk Road" to the growth of European-based maritime trade, though several respected scholars have disproven this. In fact, massive trade between China and Central Asia existed primarily- if not exclusively - during the periods in which one system of governance/ ruler was able to militarily dominate the majority of the trade route. In other words, the concept that the Silk Road was, at its heart, international, is itself counter-factual. Indeed, international borders, and especially the gaps between one strong power and another, were the weak links which regularly caused the Silk Road to shut down, sometimes for years, other times for generations. Brigandage and high tariffs were to blame, and only a power which could prevent them kept the trade flowing. In this way, the Silk Road as we conceive of it today was mostly a result of an economic phenomenon following in the tremendous Mongol conquests of the 10-14th centuries. Where Mongols conquered, the Silk Road followed. China, Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey.
So as to Mr. Page's real point: that International investment opportunities exist because the "Silk Road Tradition" in Central Asia means that "locals" are "inherently" open to international trade, this seems patently false on several points when considered in the light of actual history.

So I asked him about it directly.

The response: "While that may be true, I'm talking about the Social traditions, not the political or economic trends."

Right. So modern Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, who live in the semi-European capitals of Bishkek or Astana - cities which were built by Russians in the 19th and 20th centuries, who themselves speak either Russian or a language created by Russians, and who were forced to give up their "traditional" livelihood as nomads and instead lean European farming techniques before being forcibly relocated to collectived farms, all the while having their religious identity stripped from them by state persecution - those Kyrgyz and Kazakhs - are dictating the future of Central Asian commercial prospects because of their personal attachment to a "tradition" of "international capitalism" that may have existed to some degree back into pre-history, but which has demonstrably ceased to exist for the past 500 years.

Let's take a break.









OK.

So why have I subjected you to all of this?

We all know (or should know) that there are a lot of business (and political, and personal, etc) entities out there, and that often their interests are projected or protected by so-called "scholars" using the cloak of scholarship to mask their objectives. Not a shocker.

What's killing me is that Mr. Page isn't just an in-the-pocket academic (Director of the Bard Globalization & International Affairs Program; Former member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and $2,300 contributor to the John McCain campaign), in fact he's a late-comer to the academic racket. He was one of the big-business guys making the deals and on some level directing, or at least advising, huge policy decisions. After all the work he's done, and the experience he's had (diverting $15 billion), he still operates on the basis of demonstrably flawed logic. I don't know if it's malicious or ignorant, but either way I don't consider this to be an appropriate, ethical basis for (primarily) US economic policy abroad.

Do you?

What's most shocking is that, within the debate about how much consideration "localism" should be given when dictating economic policy to developing nations, Mr. Page is - as he himself professes - on the side of the "locals."

That's right. The above argument is actually the one offered In Defense of "local" rights.

Point: We should do whatever we want to make money.
Counterpoint: We should take (brief, inconsequential) account of local (fabricated/mythical) traditions in order to better take advantage of (exploit) local resources for our own gain (profit).

Seriously, if Mr. Page, and the hundreds of well-meaning, half-informed advocats like him, make up the counsel for the Defense, then I've got to scream Mis-trial.

And that's why fighting global capitalism with something as ridiculous as historical fact, intelligent consideration, or God-forbid local consideration, is like Horse Wrestling. It would require super-human strength, and turn our society's very system of commerce upside down.
And now I get off my podium/horse.

Weber (on the lamb)

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

Thanks for this post... I was just about to sign up for his class at NYU SCPS, but this is good to know.